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Abstract: Network interventions can help achieve behavioural change by inducing peer-pressure 
in the network. However, inducing peer-pressure without considering the structure of the existing 
social network may render the intervention ineffective or weaker. In a 7-week school-based field 
experiment using preadolescents' physical activity (PA) as a proxy for estimating behavioural 
change, we test the hypothesis that boys' and girls' distinct networks are susceptible to different 
social incentives. We run three different social-rewards schemes, in which classmates' rewards 
depend on the PA of two friends either reciprocally (directly or indirectly) or collectively. 
Compared to a random-rewards control, social-rewards schemes had an overall significantly 
positive effect on PA (51.8% increase), with females being more receptive to the direct 
reciprocity scheme (76.4%) and males to team (collective) rewards (131.5%). Differences in the 
sex-specific sub-networks can explain these findings. Network interventions adapted to the 
network-specific characteristics may constitute a powerful tool for behavioural change. 
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Peer to peer interactions can be an important source of social influence in the diffusion of ideas 
and behaviours in both physical and digital social networks
1
. The quality characteristics of 
interpersonal ties and interactions (e.g. strength, direction, frequency, locality, etc.) among the 
members of the network determine the magnitude of peer-pressure exerted by one peer on 
another and eventually the size of social influence in the network
2
. Network induction or 
alteration interventions
3
 can achieve behavioural change by changing or fixing some of these 
quality characteristics. However, different subgroups of individuals with different quality 
characteristics and/or conflicting interests may exist within the same network (sub-networks). 
This makes isolating the effect of different network interventions difficult
4
. In this study, we take 
the advantage of the controlled environment of sex-segregated school-class networks
5
 to induce 
different network interventions (based either on collective or reciprocal interaction schemes) and 
measure their impact in boys' and girls' distinct sub-networks
6,7
. As obesity and physical fitness 
have been established in the literature as "contagious" concepts
8, 9, 10, 11
 we use physical activity 
as a proxy for conceptualizing behaviour and estimating behavioural change. As changing usual 
behaviour and habits is a complex task
2
 requiring focused interventions, further generalisation of 
the results should however be done with caution.   
Introducing social norms or inducing peer-pressure can both result in social influence. In the first 
case, individuals are not required to take any conscious action while contagion happens through 
observation and copying others' behaviour, perceived (or presented or induced in the context of 
network interventions) as social norms (descriptive or injunctive)
12-14
. In the second case, the 
focus of this study, peer-pressure requires individuals and peers to make conscious decisions to 
exert pressure
15
 as a response to a specific external stimulus which inter-relates peers' welfares. 
One can consider that also in this case, a new social norm is created and maintained at least for 
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the period during which an external stimulus exists
16,17
. The power of social influence in various 
socio-economic areas is highlighted in several empirical studies (see review
18
). Recent field-, 
laboratory- and internet-based network experiments or interventions have demonstrated a role for 
peer-pressure in social mobilization for problem solving
19
, product adoption
1
, health 
behaviours
20
 or altruism
21
). Peer-pressure plays a particular important role in the promotion of 
cooperative behaviour
22
. In evolutionary biology, it is well established that cooperation evolves 
through different mechanisms
23
 which all work by exploiting the local-dyadic interactions (i.e. 
direct reciprocity, kin selection), the global-network interactions (i.e. indirect reciprocity) or both 
(i.e. network reciprocity, group selection). Social influence in general, and peer-pressure in 
particular, can be intentionally induced through carefully designed network interventions 
targeting socially desirable outcomes. The term "induction interventions" was introduced by 
Valente to classify interventions that stimulate or force peer-to-peer interactions to create 
cascades in information or behavioural diffusion
3
. Moreover, interventions on the network 
structure either by adding or deleting nodes and links, or by rewiring existing links are classified 
as "alteration interventions". The experiment presented here incorporates elements from both 
types of interventions. Building on the theoretical model by Mani and colleagues
24
 (and also its 
experimental application
25
), we induce peer-pressure by reallocating individuals' positive 
externalities towards their friends. The performance of an individual affects only and repeatedly 
his/her close-friends' payoffs. At the same time, we intervene in the structure of the network by 
suspending any rewiring process which would naturally emerge
26, 27
 as a reaction to the negative 
(i.e. lack of positive) externalities suffered by an individual due to his/her close-friends' adverse 
performance - a process which in evolutionary game theory is dubbed "spatial selection"
15
 or 
"link reciprocity"
28
. Exerting peer-pressure towards harmful (not beneficial) friends is the only 
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alternative reaction to be taken by someone who is interested in improving his/her personal 
payoff. Physical activity is used in this study as a "behavioural proxy" for estimating the size of 
behavioural change after our interventions. However, it was also chosen for its importance on 
children’s physical and mental health29; developing and evaluating effective interventions to 
increase physical activity in children is a public health priority
30
 and one of the core points of our 
study. We approach the promotion of physical activity as a "complex contagion" problem
2
 which 
requires multiple exposures to a stimulus (our experimental incentives) reinforced by multiple 
strong-tied sources (participants' friends). Using peer-pressure induction and network-rewiring 
suspension as basic principles, we designed three different social-rewards schemes, based on 
team (collective)
26, 31
, direct reciprocal
21
 or indirect reciprocal
32,33
 interaction schemes and test 
them, together with the individual reward schem
34, 35
 against a random reward scheme which 
represents our control condition.  
We conducted the study in two experimental phases (see methods), with 10 fifth-grade (i.e. 9-11 
year-olds) elementary-school classes participating in the winter phase (92 females and 84 males 
from 7 schools) and 9 different classes in the spring phase (85 females and 88 males from 8 
schools). Each class participated in only one of the experimental conditions while classes from 
the same school and phase were assigned to the same condition to avoid contamination. 
Following ethical and data protection approval (see Methods: Ethical approval), and parental 
consent, network-data was collected with the help of the class teachers who served as mediators 
between students and researchers throughout the whole experiment to preserve students' 
anonymity. For the same reason, researchers also avoided collection of any other data not 
directly linked to the intervention (e.g. socio-economic data). The strength of all dyadic ties 
(1≤τij≤5) between any two classmates i and j was elicited through a self-reported network 
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questionnaire. This information was then used for the formation of interacting teams or pairs 
(consisting of same-sex relatively good friends (τij≥3 and τji≥3), henceforth partners) in the 
social-rewards schemes. Inducing same-sex groups was both fair, due to the known sex 
differences in physical activity
36
, and also natural, due to the existence of sex homophily in the 
actual networks (E-I-index(τij=5)= -0.54, pvalue<0.001, see 
37
 and "Supplementary Notes: Network 
Analysis" and supplementary fig. S7-S8).  
In both winter and spring phases, following a one-week preliminary period (p0), each school was 
randomly assigned to one of five study conditions and received the corresponding instructions 
about incentives, rewards and grouping information (where applicable). The interventions were 
conducted in parallel for five consecutive weeks divided into four periods: three one-week long 
periods (p1,p2 and p4) and one longer period (p3) of two weeks. Data was also recorded for an 
additional one-week long post-experimental period (p5) in which students did not receive any 
kind of incentive or reward.  
Physical activity was continuously recorded using Actigraph accelerometers (either GT1M, 
GT3X or GT3X+; ActiGraph, Pensacola, FL.) throughout the seven-week experiment (except for 
the days in which data had to be extracted and prepared for participants' feedback, see 
supplementary fig. S1). Using Evenson and colleagues'
38
 cut-points, minutes spent in moderate-
to-vigorous physical activity (>2296 counts per minute (c.p.m.)) was communicated to 
participants as "minutes of intensive physical activity". This information was given to each 
participant individually (in a sealed envelope) at the onset of each period (for all pt≥1) together 
with information on their absolute performance, their relative classification (described as Gold, 
Silver or Bronze medal) and the corresponding points (100, 80 or 60) obtained in the previous 
period (pt-1). In the same letter, boys and girls were also informed about the sex-specific upper 
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and lower thresholds for achieving one of the classification medals in pt. These thresholds 
corresponded to the upper and lower tertiles of boys' and girls' physical activity distributions in 
pt-1 (see Methods: Physical Activity Measurement and Feedback). In the social-rewards schemes, 
participants were also informed about the relative performance and points of their partners.   
The different experimental conditions assigned to the school classes defined the allocation rules 
of the points earned. In the individual reward scheme, participants received the points 
corresponding to their own relative performance. In the social rewards conditions, points were 
not dependent on their own but on partners' performance (fig. 1). In the direct and indirect 
reciprocity schemes each individual’s points were divided between two partners (point takers), 
while they themselves received half of the points from each one of the same (in direct 
reciprocity) or other (in indirect reciprocity scheme) two partners. Finally in the team scheme, 
three partners were assigned to the same team and engaged in a sharing scheme similar to a 
Public Goods Game
39
; the points of all team members are summed up and then shared equally 
among them. At the end of the experiment (during p5), all points from all periods were added for 
each participant individually who could exchange them for one or more items from a gift-list. In 
the control condition, students entered a draw for having worn the accelerometer correctly. At 
the end of each experimental period (p1-p4), these participants randomly earned 100, 80 or 60 
points (with 1/3 chance), irrespective of their physical activity performance. The expected payoff 
per period (for all pt≥1) for a random student in all conditions, including the control, was equal to 
80 points. The total expected payoff from all periods (pt≥0) was 420 points (min=340 points, 
max=500 points).  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE (Two parts) 
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Results 
Following standard processing practices in child-based accelerometry
40,41
, data before 07:00 and 
after 23:00 were excluded and non-wear time was removed. An additional filter excluding days 
with less than 10 hours of valid wear time left 9776 valid days with a mean of 28.1 CI95%[13.4, 
42.8] days per participant for our analysis (supplementary table S1).  A minimum of three 
independent classes were assigned to each experimental condition with a mean of 35.4 females 
CI95%[19.3, 51.5]  and 34.4 males CI95%[20.9, 47.9] participating in each experimental condition 
(see supplementary table S2). Classes did not differ with respect to their network characteristics 
(i.e. density, centrality, transitivity and reciprocity. See Supplementary Notes: Network 
Analysis). The mean valid wear time per day was 814 CI95%[633, 996] and this did not differ 
significantly between conditions (Kruskal-Wallis
42
, χ2 (4)= 9.042, pvalue=0.0601). Overall, 
participants wore accelerometers significantly longer (≥60 min) on weekdays than on weekend 
days (Mann-Whitney non-parametric ranking
43
 test (henceforth M-W): zweekend=5.042, 
pvalue<0.001). All tests used in this analysis (including the above two) are two-tailed.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Cut-points identified by Evenson and colleagues
38
 were used to classify time spent in sedentary 
(≤100 c.p.m.), light (101 - 2295 c.p.m.), moderate (2296-4011 c.p.m.), or vigorous intensity 
physical activity (≥4012 c.p.m.) (fig. 2). To check the robustness of our main findings, different 
cut-points were used to classify the same data (see supplementary fig. S2). We used minutes of 
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moderate intensity and above (moderate-to-vigorous physical activity; MVPA) as a 
comparability measure
36
. Because of the sex-specific design and sex differences observed in 
MVPA (M-W for all and p0 periods: zall=7.238, zp0=4.948; pvalues<0.001), the data was analyzed 
and presented separately for boys and girls (fig. 3). Significant daily MVPA fluctuations of the 
actual mean MVPA (black line) (Kruskal-Wallis test
42
 for difference among different week days; 
χ2(6)=72.157, pvalue<0.001) have been smoothed out by displaying the estimates of a locally 
(bandwidth: 0.3) weighted regression of MVPA on experimental days (red line). Fig. 3 shows the 
significant differences in children's MVPA on different days of the week, different weather 
conditions, and between holidays and school days (see M-W tests in supplementary material). 
These persistent environmental effects render statistical adjustment necessary. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In fig. 4 we averaged out all these effects by pooling data from both phases (A) and all 
experimental periods (B) for each of the different experimental conditions (by sex). To account 
for the different number of observations in the two experimental phases, we weighted each 
observation with the inverse of its probability of being sampled in experimental phase 1 or 2 (i.e. 
assuming the same number of observations by treatment and sex in each phase, see 
supplementary fig. S3 for non-balanced sample). The estimates of the locally (bandwidth: 0.3) 
weighted regression of MVPA on experimental days are presented in part A, with dotted left and 
right line-extensions indicating preliminary (p0) and post-experimental (p5) periods, respectively. 
Information from these two non-incentivized periods is not included in the calculation of the 
pooled average MVPA from all periods, illustrated by bar graphs (part B).  Red error bars 
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correspond to 95% confidence intervals of the respective subsamples (see also supplementary 
fig. S4 for box-plots). M-W tests on MVPA between different treatments (see supplementary 
table S3) confirm that for boys, team rewards consistently and significantly elicit higher levels of 
MVPA than the control scheme in both experimental phases. For girls, this was the case for the 
direct and indirect reciprocity schemes. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
We used a multilevel hierarchical model to control for all observed (weather, weekends, 
holidays) and unobserved environmental effects in a more systematic way and allow the variance 
of the unit effects to be estimated conditional on the data and parameters at all different nested 
levels. In particular we estimated a 3-level mixed effects model in which repeated daily 
measurements (level 1) were nested within the same child (level 2) who was nested in one of the 
classrooms (level 3) participating in the study. Four different dummies, one for each different 
condition (IV-individual, DI-Direct Reciprocity, IND-Indirect reciprocity, TE-Team rewards) 
were included in the fixed part of the model together with the dummy variable fem indicating 
females and the continuous variable val_time indicating the daily minutes of valid accelerometry 
wear time. The control condition (random rewards) was omitted and functioned as a baseline 
level. Cross-classification of the repeated within-subject measurements was also handled in the 
fixed part of the model by including 73 day-dummies, Dumt (i.e. ((37) valid experimental days * 
(2) experimental phases) -(1) the baseline day). Most importantly, using time-dummies in the 
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fixed part of the model also served for controlling for all observed (weather, holidays, weekend 
etc.) or unobserved environmental effects.    
With regard to the random part of the model, in the classroom level-3 we included a random 
coefficient for sex (𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑡) accounting for the different sex composition of the 
different classrooms and the sex-specific weekly relative scores and thresholds.  In the child 
level-2 we simply included a random intercept 𝜐0𝑗𝑖. Finally, we accounted for heteroskedasticity 
by classroom in the level-1 repeated measurements by adding 19 independent residual errors 
(𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡), one for each classroom (i.e. ∀𝑗: 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀𝑗
2 𝐼), so that 𝐸𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡
19
𝑗=1 ) (see Methods and 
Supplementary methods). The resulting model, additionally including the interactions between 
the different conditions and sex, is described by the following equation: 
𝑀𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑉𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐼𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽105𝐼𝑉𝑗𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽205𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽305𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽405𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑣𝑎𝑙_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡+5𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑡
74
𝑡=2
 + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗
∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 𝜐0𝑗𝑖 + 𝐸𝑗𝑖𝑡                     (1) 
Table 1 shows the coefficients, standard errors and 95% confidence intervals of the main 
variables (IV, DI, IND, TE, fem) of the fixed part in eq.1 (see supplementary text for the 
complete regression analysis). In M1, team incentives and direct reciprocity have a positive and 
significant effect on MVPA (𝛽4 = 4.93, pvalue=0.001, CI95%:[1.99, 7.88] and 𝛽3 = 4.30, 
pvalue=0.010, CI95%:[1.05, 7.56] respectively), corresponding to a respective 67.1% (𝛽4/𝛽0) and 
58.5% (𝛽3/𝛽0)) improvement as compared to the control condition (captured by 𝛽0). Indirect 
reciprocity also had a positive effect, but this was marginally non-significant (β2=2.69, 
pvalue=0.061, CI95%:[-0.13, 5.50] ). Pooling data from all social reward schemes together (IND, DI 
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and TE) into one common regressor  in M2 we found that in general social incentives had a 
positive and significant (β2-4=3.81 , pvalue=0.001, CI95%:[1.50, 6.12) effect on MVPA, with a 
51.8% higher value compared to the control condition. In contrast, MVPA in the IV scheme was 
found not to be significantly different (β1=2.30 , pvalue= 0.093, CI95%:[-0.38, 4.97) from the 
MVPA in the control condition. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Including interaction terms between different conditions and sex (M3), we found that the effect 
of the team rewards on boys' MVPA was very high and significant (β4=8.77, pvalue<0.001, 
CI95%:[4.63, 12.92), corresponding to a 131.5% (𝛽4/𝛽0) increase compared to the control 
condition (𝛽0). While for girls the effect of team rewards was non-significant (𝛽4 + 𝛽405=2.53, 
χ2(1)=2.02, pvalue=0.1555), the direct-reciprocity scheme affected girls' MVPA significantly 
(𝛽3 + 𝛽305=5.441, χ
2
(1)=5.82,  pvalue=0.0159) and positively (76.5% improvement compared to 
control ((𝛽
3
+ 𝛽
305
)/(𝛽
0
+ 𝛽
5
))). Direct reciprocity did not affect boys' MVPA and indirect 
reciprocity was also non-significant for both boys and girls (only marginally (𝛽2 + 𝛽205=3.195, 
χ2(1)=3.27, pvalue=0.0706) for the latter).  When combining all social rewards conditions in M4, 
we found that social reward schemes had a positive and significant effect both in boys’ (𝛽2−4= 
4.375, pvalue=0.002, CI95%:[1.60, 7.15]) and girls’ (𝛽2−4 + 𝛽205−405= 3.346, χ
2
(1)=6.15, 
pvalue=0.0132) MVPA. The individual incentives however did not significantly impact MVPA for 
either sex. The significant increases in MVPA in males in team scheme (𝛽4=11.20, pvalue<0.001, 
CI95%:[6.23, 16.18) and in females in direct reciprocity scheme (𝛽3=4.21, pvalue=0.040, 
CI95%:[0.20, 8.23]) are confirmed when running eq.1 regression model for the two separate sex 
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subsamples (column M53 to M56 in supplementary table S5). Finally, testing for post-
experimental effects (see supplementary methods and table S7), we found that while MVPA in 
all social incentives return to their initial levels (i.e. no significant differences between MVPApre 
from p0 and MVPApost from p5), interestingly, the MVPApost in individual scheme was 
significantly lower than the corresponding MVPApre. As we discuss later this result is probably 
partly driven by students' enthusiastic and over-reactive behaviour at the beginning (p0) of the 
study due to the Hawthorne
44
 or demand
45
 effects. 
Discussion 
Two main points may be inferred from our findings. First, unlike individual schemes, social 
reward schemes were found to have a significant overall effect in changing preadolescents' 
physical activity behaviour, translating into 24.4 additional minutes of MVPA per week (as 
compared to the control).  Second, the different social reward schemes have asymmetric effects 
in boys and girls. Boys were more susceptible to the team incentives, achieving  an additional 
59.2 minutes of MVPA in a week compared to controls, while girls were more receptive to the 
direct reciprocity scheme, achieving an additional 36.9 minutes of MVPA per week. It is 
important to stress here that these two findings are net from any design-effects already 
introduced (but not measured) in the control condition (e.g. weekly point system and final 
rewards, performance feedback, relevant positioning in the classroom, game spirit, accelerometer 
use, etc.). Moreover, through regression analysis we statistically controlled for any 
environmental effects which could potentially influence participants (e.g. weather, holidays, etc.) 
or school-classes (e.g. influence by school directors, teachers, etc., also known in the literature as 
Hawthorne effects
44
). 
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Although we cannot claim that our design entirely excludes self-interest (incentives which are 
directly linked to individual payoffs) from the social rewards schemes (e.g. participants may 
comply to "peer-pressure" for increasing their individual payoffs by reducing "social" sanctions), 
the results from individual reward scheme indicate that self-interest itself is not a significant 
driver of behavioural change in this situation. In contrast, induced peer-pressure (likely together 
with other confounding factors, such as image scoring
46
, and observability power
9
) has an 
additional effect on the participants’ time spent in MVPA as seen with the social rewards 
schemes. To understand the sex differences between the different social rewards schemes we 
should focus on the interplay between the different interactions induced (by design) and the 
different characteristics of the pre-existing sex-segregated networks.  
Boys appear to maximize their MVPA performance when exposed to the team-competitive 
environment of the team rewards scheme, a result which is in agreement with a well-established 
finding in the literature
 6,7
 that male preadolescents are in general more interested than females in 
playing team games and forming larger networks
5, 47
. Interestingly, our within-classroom 
network analysis (see Supplementary Notes: Network Analysis) also shows that, compared to 
girls, boys are more frequently characterized as good or best friends (τij≥4) and have a more 
central role (higher closeness) both in the overall and in the within sex-specific classroom 
network.  
In contrast, girls maximized their MVPA performance under the direct reciprocity scheme. This 
result can also be related to the preference of preadolescent females for small intimate groups
6, 4
, 
usually including two or three reciprocal friendships
48
.  In our dataset we also find that although 
girls have fewer "best-friendships", these friendships are more frequently reciprocated than in 
boys. We would argue that as direct bilateral interactions are more common within girls' intimate 
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friendships, girls were therefore more responsive to direct reciprocity interaction schemes than 
boys.  
As a robustness check we repeated our regression analysis (see supplementary table S6) using (a) 
an alternative activity-time classification, characterizing MVPA according to the cut points 
proposed by Freedson and colleagues
49, 50
, (b) a less conservative filter including the 
accelerometer-delivery days (Wednesdays) with at least 5 hours of valid wear time (1359 
additional observations) and (c) an additional control for the initial physical activity levels of the 
participants.  In all cases, our sex-specific findings were retained. 
Our study used randomly chosen independent small social networks to compare different 
incentive schemes and interaction structures for increasing physical activity in preadolescents; 
however, the work does have limitations. Although schools were located in different villages, 
they were all from a small geographical zone which makes it difficult to prevent contamination 
and also challenges the external validity of the study. On the other hand, recruiting subjects from 
the same area also reduces socio-economic differences between schools (at an aggregate level), 
and minimizes other environmental effects. At a disaggregate level though (students), we were 
unable to control for potential socioeconomic differences, which could be affecting the 
effectiveness of the network intervention. For instance, during the "pairing" process we took into 
account of the sex-based homophily but we were unable to take other characteristics into account 
(e.g. socio-economic status, racial or ethnical identification). This could have potentially affect 
the structure of the network (due to homophily) and therefore affect the intervention outcomes. 
Moreover, the existence of other within-classroom environmental factors related to the methods, 
and most importantly with the conductors or monitors
44
 of the experiment, should also be treated 
with caution as they might have an impact on children's behaviour, especially at the start of the 
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study. However, we argue that these reactivity effects
51
 decline over the course of our 7-week 
study and substituted by the intended effect of our interventions. To address this point 
specifically, we repeated the analyses using only the data collected during the third period of the 
experiment as subjects are already exposed to the monitors for three weeks, there is no end-of-
the-game effect and it lasts for two consecutive weeks (with no feedback or researcher contact). 
Here, our main sex-specific results were also retained (see supplementary table S6 column M64). 
Finally, due to significant sex differences in MVPA, it was impossible for us to test the possible 
implications of our network interventions on mixed-sex groups, which may be a topic of interest 
for future research.  
Our design also allows us to draw conclusions on post-experimental effects as we measured 
physical activity for an additional week after the intervention period (when subjects did not 
receive additional points or prizes). As in many other intervention studies focusing on post 
experimental effects
51, 52
 and on the effectiveness of intrinsic (vs. extrinsic) incentives
16,17 
, we 
also found that physical activity levels in our social incentives schemes returned to pre-
experimental levels (no significant differences between MVPApre and MVPApost , see column 
M72 of supplementary table S7). This result primarily suggests that our intervention did not 
create lasting change in norms but was completely contingent on the social rewards scheme. 
However, our post-experimental analysis reveals an additional information; activity levels of 
those in the individual incentive scheme were significantly lower in the post-experimental as 
compared to pre-experimental period (-7.57 minutes per day (pvalue=0.002, CI95%[-12.37, -2.78]).  
In contrast, participants in the social incentives schemes simply returned to their initial physical 
activity levels. This implies that at least in relative terms, social incentives were more sustainable 
than individual incentives. 
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As the primary focus of this trial was not to study the persistence (or not) of post-experimental 
effects, we are unable to provide evidence-based explanations for these findings but instead 
hypothesize on the reasons. The researchers observed and teachers confirmed that in the pre-
experimental period students were very enthusiastic in participating and particularly interested in 
and curious about their "magic box" (accelerometer).  This observation gives reason to believe 
that pre-experimental performance might be higher than "normal" performance due to 
Hawthorne
44
 and demand effects
45
. This would imply that, compared to "normal" levels, the 
post-experimental performance might be actually higher in social incentives (and comparably, 
not that low in the individual incentives). As our design does not allow controlling for "normal" 
physical activity level, this is only a conjecture based on our observations in the field which 
would need to be tested with a different experimental design.  
Our network interventions were conducted in two steps. In the first step we elicited within-
classroom social networks and fixed the interaction structures (between same-sex friends of the 
same pairs or teams) which remained "locked" until the end of the study. In the second step we 
simply induced peer-pressure among friends within the locked-structures by attributing and 
exchanging points as a result of engaging in MVPA. It is likely that the interaction structures in 
the social rewards schemes would normally change after the first interactions if they were not 
enforced by-design. For instance, high performers would most probably seek to team up with 
other high performers in order to achieve higher rewards, or popular students could have 
benefited from their extensive network by grouping with high-performing best friends, 
exchanging in a way their social capital for a higher return in terms of game-points
26-28, 15
. By 
using locked interaction structures we sought to create a situation in which peer-pressure was the 
only reaction mechanism for any child seeking to increase his/her rewards; s/he simply had to 
 18 
 
encourage his/her partners to be more active. It is important to add that we did not observe any 
bullying effects against the weak performers. In contrast, teachers informally reported an 
increase in the quality of social behaviour among children.  
The results indicate that sex-specific network interventions might be a powerful tool to positively 
change lifestyle behaviours of preadolescents, with boys being more susceptible to team 
interaction structures and girls to dyadic reciprocal structures. Changing usual behaviour and 
habits is complex, and this achievement may signal that this approach may have different 
applications in tasks of equal complexity. One needs to be aware however that our network 
interventions may not be that effective in eliciting change in behaviours of a different nature. For 
instance, in our study we took advantage of the inherited competitive nature of physical activities 
(especially in the school environment) which may not be relevant for other sorts of behavioural 
change (e.g. substance use). In a more abstract context, carefully designed network interventions 
based on the specific characteristics of the social networks and the nature of the bilateral 
relations and interactions may constitute a powerful tool for achieving behavioural change.  
 
Methods 
Recruitment  
Students were recruited from 19 fifth-grade elementary-school classes in the same geographical 
region in Italy to minimize environmental effects. Over 98% of children provided signed parental 
informed consent (supplementary fig. S5) and participated in the study (Four parents did not sign 
the informed consent and they children did not participate in the study. One student dropped out 
due to health issues (unrelated to the study).  
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No prior sample size calculation was performed. The size of the sample was determined by the 
projects capacity and practical restrictions such us the number of available accelerometers (about 
180 devises) and the number of recruited classes (19). To increase the sample size, the 
intervention was repeated twice (winter and spring experimental phases). Supplementary table 
S2 shows these sub-sample sizes by gender, classes and phases. The final sample size (and the 
respective size of sub-groups by gender, classes, experimental conditions and phase) was 
sufficient to perform non-parametric (Mann- Whitney, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis) and 
parametric (multilevel hierarchical model) analyses and testing, even when the data was 
collapsed at subjects level (one observation per individual).  
 
Network Data Elicitation and Teams-Pairs formation 
The strength of all dyadic ties (τij) between classmates i and j was elicited through a teacher-
administered self-reported questionnaire in which participants rated individually each one of 
their classmates (see supplementary fig. S6) from 1 "… is not my friend" to 5 "…is one of my 
best friends" (1≤τij≤5). In the supplementary fig. S7 we use modern Multidimensional Scaling
54
 
to visualize spatial distance only between best friends (τij=5). Separate colours highlight boys 
and girls, while we also illustrate all friendships of τij≥3. These graphs demonstrate that most 
networks are sex-segregated.     
The network data was used for the formation of interacting teams or pairs only in the social 
reward schemes. Only same-sex classmates with relatively strong ties (τij≥τji≥3) were randomly 
matched together (only two exceptions where τij≥3≥τji). Considering that school networks were 
characterized by sex homophily (see supplementary fig. S7-S8) and that students would probably 
self-select to pair or team up with same-sex colleagues, we followed this natural predisposition 
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and induced same-sex matching that also allowed us to control for known sex differences on 
children's physical activity levels
36
. Matching relatively strong-tied classmates was purposely 
designed to maximize peer-pressure between relatively close friends
24
 and also to minimize the 
possibility of any adverse effects between distant friends. Pseudo-randomisation was preferred to 
self-selection matching to ensure compatibility in the matching process for all classmates even in 
the most complicated interaction schemes (i.e. indirect reciprocity).     
 
Experimental Phases, Periods and Conditions 
The study was conducted in two experimental phases in 2014, with 10 classes (from 7 schools, 
classes from the same schools were participating in the same condition) participating in the 
winter phase (Nw=176) and 9 different classes (from 8 schools) in the spring phase (Ns=173). 
Principal teachers served as contact points between students and researchers throughout the 
whole experiment to preserve students' anonymity (teachers were not informed about the 
performance of the students throughout the whole experiment, see supplementary fig. S9 for 
teachers' instructions). In both phases, after a 1-week preliminary period (p0), schools were 
randomly assigned to different intervention conditions which were conducted in parallel for 5 
more consecutive weeks divided into 4 periods: three 1-week (p1,p2 and p4) and one 2-week (p3) 
period. As researchers required knowledge about the experimental condition in order to prepare 
and deliver the corresponding feedback, data collection and analysis were not performed blind to 
the conditions of the experiments. However, the main outcome measure is objectively measured 
and therefore researcher bias will have unlikely to have influenced the outcome assessment. The 
study concluded with a final 1-week post-experimental period (p5) in which students did not 
receive any kind of incentive (points).  Classification medals were given virtually and 
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corresponding to 100, 80 and 60 points in all but the control condition (in which the random 
allocation of points was used). The different experimental conditions implemented in the classes 
defined the points allocation rules among classmates. In the individual reward scheme (IV) 
participants received the points corresponding to their own classification medal. In the social 
rewards conditions, though, points were not allocated to the "self" but to other classmates (fig. 
1), who were bilaterally satisfying (with two exceptions) the condition τij≥τji≥3 (for facilitating 
analysis henceforth we call them as "partners"). In the direct (DI) and indirect reciprocity (IND) 
schemes each individual was engaged in two active and two passive interactions; s/he a) was 
sending half of her/his points to one partner (point-taker) and b) the remaining half to another 
point-taker while s/he c) was receiving the half of the points of one partner (point-giver) and d) 
the half of the points of another point-giver. In the IND each participant was interacting with 
four different partners while in the DI they only interacted with two partners who were at the 
same time both point-givers and point-takers. Open network structure was imposed on all same-
sex networks assigned to DI, by preventing an individual's point-givers/takers to interact with 
each other. However, in the IND, the open network structure condition was satisfied only for 
those same-sex IND networks with N ≥10 (4 out 6). For the remaining two IND networks, we 
allowed for interaction between point-givers and point-takers but never within point-givers or 
within point-takers. Finally in the team scheme (TE), three partners were assigned to the same 
team and engaged in a Public Goods Game
39 
in which the points of all team members were 
gathered together and then shared equally among them.   
 
Instructions of the Game (accelerometers and conditions) 
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Special attention has been given to the explanation of the instructions both to the teachers and to 
the students. Teachers received general instructions about their role in the conduct of the 
experiment during the recruitment period. The supplementary fig. S9 shows the written 
instructions given to the responsible teachers. Prior to the experiment, researchers also organized 
an interview with each one of the teachers in order to be sure that they accurately understood the 
general instructions. Moreover, researchers met teachers in the school on a weekly base during 
the collection/delivery of the accelerometers and answered any questions raised by them or the 
students.  
For the instructions to the students we used a "game" language (e.g. we use the term "Magic 
Box" instead of accelerometer) which was easier to be understood by students. Instructions were 
given in two different stages in order for them not to be overwhelmed with new information: A) 
Participants were instructed at the beginning of p0 to wear the accelerometers on a belt on their 
right hip, during all waking hours (except when performing water or contact sports) throughout 
all periods (and p5), including weekends. Additional to the written illustrated instructions (see 
supplementary fig. S10), researchers gave a small demonstration in the classroom for the correct 
use of the accelerometers. B) Incentive-instructions and classmates grouping/matching (where 
applicable) were revealed to students at the beginning of p1. In the social incentive schemes 
students received their partners' names and were described in detail how their behaviour can 
potentially affect their partners' points. In addition, we attached on each child's accelerometer a 
personalized key ring which was indicating the names of his/her partners (when applicable). In 
supplementary fig. S11 we show the exact information received by the students.  
At the beginning of period p2 when researchers (through teachers) gave the students their first 
feedback (corresponding to their performance in p1), there were only few cases in the social 
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incentive schemes where students reported that they had not understood the interaction scheme 
with their partners. However, the further information given at that stage (see supplementary fig. 
S13) was enough to erase any confusion, as in the next week (beginning of period p3) teachers 
did not receive any further questions regarding the interaction schemes and assured the 
researchers that all students already knew their partners and were aware of how the points were 
distributed or exchanged.  The students participating in the random rewards scheme found it 
most difficult to understand that their points were independent of their performance. However, 
after receiving further information at the beginning of p1, this was resolved. Supplementary table 
S6 (column M64) demonstrates that our main results were retained even after excluding these 
potentially "noisy" periods.          
 
Physical Activity Measurement and Feedback  
Physical activity was measured by Actigraph accelerometers (either GT1M, GT3X or GT3X+; 
ActiGraph, Pensacola, FL.) and was communicated individually to classmates as minutes of 
intensive physical activity (examples were given in the classroom and from p1 participants could 
also observe it in the provided histogram-feedback). Accelerometers were handed out at the 
beginning of each period (Wednesday, 12:00), and collected at the end of the period (Tuesday, 
08.00) for data extraction, recharging and feedback preparation (see supplementary fig. S1).  
At the beginning of each period (for all pt≥1) participants received individual information (see 
supplementary fig. S12-S13) including: 
 a) a histogram of their average hourly MVPA minutes in pt-1 and their average individual 
period-score (si,pt-1),  
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b) the upper ( HtT ) and the lower (
L
tT ) within-classroom thresholds defined for the current period 
pt for boys and girls separately and  coinciding to the upper (Pr[St-1<st-1]≤2/3 and Pr[St-1≤ st-
1]≥2/3)  and lower (Pr[St-1< st-1]≤1/3 and Pr[St-1≤ st-1]≥1/3) tertiles of boys and girls score-
distributions (St-1) in pt-1.  
c) Their relative classification in pt-1 falling into one of the following three categories: Golden if 
si,t-1 ≥
H
tT 1  , Silver if 
H
tT 1  >si,t-1 ≥
L
tT 1 and Bronze medal if si,t-1 <
L
tT 1 .  
d) The points obtained based on their (or on their partners') performance in pt-1.  In the social 
reward schemes, participants were also informed about the medals and points of their partners. 
This 3-category medal system was designed in order to dampen competition (after p1 all students 
could potentially reach HtT  and win the gold medal)) which, if too extreme, could cause negative 
side effects (e.g. hostile behaviour towards high performers). This reward system proved 
successful as teachers reported no conflicts among students but an increase in the team spirit 
especially for the ones participating in the team condition.  
Instruction intelligibility among 9-11 year old students was a key challenge of this study due to 
the complexity of the interaction schemes. However, we managed to address this issue by a 
repeated interaction with teachers and students before and during the experiment and by offering 
clear instructions and feedback on a regular basis. In supplementary fig. S1 we show the timeline 
of the experiment, highlighting in red letters all the occasions when researchers interact with 
teachers and students during the experiment. After p1 teachers reported that students did not have 
any more questions and they fully understood the rules of the game.    
 
Experimental Payments 
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Additional to the points earned in p1-p4, participants received a 100-points bonus at the end of p0 
for correctly wearing accelerometers. Irrespective of condition, points from all periods (pt≥0) 
were summed at the end of the experiment (during p5) for each participant individually who 
could exchange them with one or more items from a gift-list including 94 items of different 
points-value (see supplemetary fig. S14). This was also true for the control condition, in which 
students were earning 100, 80 or 60 points with 1/3 wining probability after a lottery draw at the 
end of each experimental period (p1-p4).  The expected payoff per period (for all pt≥1) for a 
random student in all conditions, including the control, was equal to 80 points, with the total 
expected payoff from all periods reaching (pt≥0) 420 points (min=340 points, max=500 points). 
By providing all participants with the same-size material incentives we ensured that any resulting 
differences between students participating in different experimental conditions would be due to 
the different intervention scheme and not to the size or the material incentive itself. Hence, 
material incentives were included as a methodological tool for quantifying physical activity 
performance while their effectiveness
55
 does not constitute an objective of this study.  
 
Physical Activity Data Collection and Filtering 
Accelerometers were set to record at 10-second epochs, and data from the accelerometers were 
downloaded using ActiLife software (version 5.7.4, full edition). Data before 07:00 and after 
23:00 were excluded and non-wear time was removed, using a criterion of consecutive runs of 
zero counts per minute (cpm) for a minimum duration of 60 minutes, allowing for a ‘spike 
tolerance’ of 236, 38. Remaining data were included if accelerometer wear time was at least 10 
hours per day. The application of this last filter basically removed all delivery and recollection 
days and left our sample with a total of 9776 valid days (see supplementary fig. S15-S16 and 
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table S1). At least three independent school-classes were assigned to each experimental 
condition with an average of 35.4 females and 34.4 males participating in each condition (see 
suplemtary table S2). The mean number of valid days per individual was 28.1 (SD) with team 
scheme (TE) only being significantly different (pvalue<0.01 in all between-conditions bilateral 
Mann-Whitney non-parametric ranking
43
 tests including the TE) to the other schemes mainly due 
to the late involvement of two TE classes. The mean number of valid minutes per day was 814 
(SD), which did not differ significantly between conditions (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 =  9.042 with 4 
d.f. and pvalue=0.0601). However, accelerometers were worn for significantly longer (≥60 min) 
on weekdays as compared to weekend days (M-W: zweekend=5.042, pvalue<0.001).  
 
Regression Analysis 
We performed regression analysis to control for any environmental effects in a systematic way. 
The dependent variable was the total daily minutes in MVPA. In order to capture treatment 
effects we used the following four dummy variables as the main regressors for our model: 
 Individual (IV): takes value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the 
implementation of the individual rewards scheme, otherwise 0.   
 Direct (DI): takes value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the implementation 
of the direct reciprocity scheme, otherwise 0. 
 Indirect (IND): takes value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the 
implementation of the indirect reciprocity scheme, otherwise 0. 
 Team (TE): takes value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the implementation 
of the team rewards scheme, otherwise 0. 
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Note that these dummies take the value 0 for all those measurements recorded during p0 and p5 
when all children either received the 100 points bonus or not received any points at all. The 
dummy variable control taking the value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the 
implementation of the control scheme is used as control group for our regressions and therefore 
omitted from the regression table. 
 
We used a multilevel model (using maximum-likelihood estimator) to allow the variance of the 
unit effects to be estimated conditional on the data and parameters at all different nested levels 
(school-class(j) > student(i) > measurements(t)). In particular we used a 3-level mixed effects 
model in which repeated daily measurements (level 1 t-level) are nested within the same child 
(level 2 or i-level), who is nested in one of the classes (level 3 or j-level) participating in the 
study. Treatments' dummies were included in the fixed part of the model together with the 
dummy variable fem indicating females and the continuous variable val_time reporting the 
number of validated daily minutes. Note that we filtered out all data with val_time≤600 minutes. 
Cross-classification of the repeated within-subject measurements was also handled in the fixed 
part of the model by including 73 day-dummies, Dumt (i.e. ((37) valid experimental days * (2) 
experimental phases) -(1) the baseline-reference day). Using time-dummies (Dumτ, 𝜏 ∈ [1,74]) 
in the fixed part of the model also enabled controlling for all observed (weather, holidays, 
weekend etc.) or unobserved environmental effects.    
 
With regards to the random part of the model, at the class-level we included a random coefficient 
for sex (fem) to account for the differences in sex composition of the different classrooms, 
expecting classes with a high percentage of males to have a higher average classroom 
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performance. The random sex coefficient also accounted for the fact that although boys and girls 
in the same classroom were allocated to the same condition, their relative performance and 
weekly thresholds were sex-specific. We also allowed for the random effects at level-3 to be 
correlated (general symmetric covariance matrix). At level-2, random effects accounted for 
heteroskedasticity by classroom at the measurements-level (see supplementary table S4, column 
M43). Note that heteroskedastic residuals at this level also captured phase-heteroskedasticity 
since each class participated in either the first or in the second experimental phase. See 
supplementary material for regression model and post-hoc testing and diagnostic. Data 
distribution in this analysis was assumed to be normal but this was not formally tested. In 
supplementary figure S18 we show the actual residuals distribution. As compared to the normal 
distribution, the distribution of our residuals is slightly skewed on the left (0.83) and leptokurtic 
(5.56). 
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Data availability 
The datasets generated and analysed during the current study are available from the 
corresponding author upon request. 
Code Availability 
The code (.do files) used in our statistical analysis and image production is available upon 
request from the corresponding author. 
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A) Rewarding for physical activity performance. A 
hypothetical scenario of 9 classmates is presented.  Red, 
blue and green upper rectangles represent children's 
relative physical activity performance in the classroom 
in one period and correspond to 100, 80 and 60 points 
respectively. B-D) Points allocation in Social-Rewards 
Schemes. Each red, blue and green slice (arrow) 
corresponds to 50, 40 and 30 points allocation (transfer) 
respectively. B) Direct reciprocity scheme; each child 
divides his/her points between two partners and receives 
half of the points that each one of these partners 
generated. C) Indirect reciprocity scheme; each child 
divides his/her points between two partners and receives 
half of the points that two other partners generated. D) 
Team scheme; the points of 3 partners belonging to the 
same team are added to a common pot and then shared 
equally among the partners. 
Figures :  
                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A                 
B                 C                 D                 
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Fig. 2: Classification of Daily Activity-Time for all experimental conditions (nphase1 =176, 
nphase2=173). The classification uses Evenson and colleagues cut-points (30).  
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Fig. 3: Average Daily Minutes of Moderate to Vigorous Physical Activity (MVPA). Data is 
aggregated and averaged at day-level for 92 and 85 females and for 84 and 88 males in Phases 1 
and 2 respectively. Black line corresponds to the means of the actual MVPA while the red line are 
the estimates from a locally (with 0.3 bandwidth) weighted regression of MVPA on experimental 
days. Black dots and triangles indicate Mondays and Saturdays respectively. Blue, yellow and 
green shadowed days-periods highlight, rainy (precipitation more than 5mm), warm (temperature 
higher than 10°C) and holidays days/periods respectively.  
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Fig. 4: Average Daily Minutes Moderate to Vigorous Physical Activity (MVPA) by 
experimental condition and sex (167 females and 162 males). (A) Locally weighted estimations 
of MVPA on experimental days (pooled data from both experimental phases). Dotted lines 
correspond to non-incentivized periods. (B) Pooled data from all experimental periods (p1-p5) with 
95% confidence interval error bars. (A-B) Each observation has been weighted by the inverse of 
its probability of being sampled in experimental phase 1 or 2.  
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Table 1:Multilevel Regression Models on MVPA 
 Table 1:Multilevel Regression Models on MVPA 
 (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) 
F
IX
E
D
 E
F
F
E
C
T
S
 
C
o
ef
fi
ci
e
n
ts
 C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
𝛽1 (IV) 2.32 (1.36) 
[-0.34, 4.98] 
2.30 (1.37) 
[-0.38, 4.97] 
1.85 (1.66) 
[-1.41, 5.11] 
1.80 (1.68) 
[-1.49, 5.09] 
𝛽2 (IND) 2.69 (1.43) 
[-0.13, 5.50] 
3
.8
1
*
*
 
(1
.1
8
) 
[1
.5
0
, 
6
.1
2
] 
2.12 (1.87) 
[-1.54, 5.77] 
4
.3
7
*
*
 
(1
.4
2
) 
[1
.6
0
, 
7
.1
5
] 
𝛽3 (DI) 4.30
** 
(1.66) 
[1.05, 7.56] 
3.47 (2.10) 
[-0.66, 7.59] 
𝛽4 (TE) 4.93
** 
(1.50) 
[1.99, 7.88] 
8.77
*** 
(2.11) 
[4.63, 12.92] 
 𝛽5 (fem) -14.27
*** 
(2.47) 
[-19.12, -9.43] 
-14.34
*** 
(2.47) 
[-19.19, -9.50] 
-13.79
***
 (2.38) 
[-18.46, -9.12] 
-14.11
***
 (2.54) 
[-19.10, -9.13] 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
𝛽105 (IV*fem)   1.03 (2.01) 
[-2.92, 4.98] 
1.03 (2.02) 
[-2.92, 5.00] 
      𝛽205 (IND*fem)  
 
1.08 (2.23) 
[-3.29, 5.45] 
-1
.0
2
9
 
(1
.4
4
8
) 
[-
3
.8
7
, 
1
.1
8
1
] 
𝛽305(DI*fem)  1.97 (2.83) 
[-3.57, 7.52] 
𝛽405 (TE*fem)  -6.24
* 
(2.46) 
[-11.06, -1.43] 
 𝛽0 (Constant) 7.01 (3.58) 
[0.004, 14.02] 
7.35
*
 (3.62) 
[0.26, 14.44] 
6.67 (3.54) 
[-0.27, 13.61] 
7.24* (3.63) 
[-0.14, 14.35] 
M
o
d
el
 
S
ta
ts
 Observations 9776 9776 9776 9776 
 Wald χ2 2063.2 2057.4 2078.1 2059.0 
pvalue< 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Notes: Minutes of Moderate to Vigorous Physical Activity (MVPA) is the dependent variable in all models. Standard errors 
and 95% confidence interval in parentheses and brackets respectively. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Four different 
dummies, one for each different condition (IV-individual, DI-Direct Reciprocity, IND-Indirect reciprocity, TE-Team 
rewards) and their interaction with sex (in M3 and M4) are included in the fixed part of the model. Control (valid time, 
date) variables, random effects parameters and residuals as described in eq.1, are omitted from the table for facilitating 
illustration. In M2 and M4, variables IND, DI, TE are collapsed to one variable (social rewards).    
 
 
 
